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Abstract
This paper draws a distinction between ‘right MacIntyreans’ who are relatively optimistic that MacIntyre’s vision of ethics 
can be realised in capitalist society, and ‘left MacIntyreans’ who are sceptical about this possibility, and aims to show that the 
‘left MacIntyrean’ position is a promising perspective available to business ethicists. It does so by arguing for a distinction 
between ‘community-focused’ practices and ‘excellence-focused’ practices. The latter concept fulfils the promise of prac-
tices to provide us with an understanding of the best work for humankind and highlights the affinities between MacIntyre’s 
concept of a practice and Marx’s conception of good work as free, creative activity. The paper concludes with a suggestion 
that we reflect on the best forms of work so that we can strive to ensure the very best activities, those most consonant with 
our flourishing, one day become available to all.
Keywords MacIntyre · Marx · Good work
Introduction
While some business ethicists have drawn attention to 
MacIntyre’s radical and egalitarian political thought (e.g. 
Couch and Bernacchio 2020; Sinnicks 2018a), for the most 
part applications of MacIntyre’s work within the field have 
sought to show that his key ethical insights can be sepa-
rated from this aspect of his work. According to MacIntyre, 
contemporary large-scale politics is barren (1998), corpo-
rate modernity is incompatible with moral agency (1979a), 
the modern economic order incentivises personal injustice 
(1995), our economic and social order is fundamentally 
compartmentalised (1999a), and we inhabit an emotivist 
culture in which ethical discourse is largely an expression 
of untutored feeling (2007). In light of this he has suggested 
that the problems of business ethics are insoluble (1982), 
that management is inherently amoral (2007), and that busi-
ness ethics courses are a waste of time (2015). In this paper 
I offer an account of MacIntyre’s concept of practices that 
takes these claims seriously.
To do so, I begin by outlining MacIntyre’s concept of 
practices, its range of applications, and why it has been so 
appealing to scholars interested in how work contributes 
to human flourishing. I draw a distinction between ‘right 
MacIntyreans’, who are relatively optimistic that MacIn-
tyre’s vision of ethics can be realised in capitalist society, 
and ‘left MacIntyreans’, who are sceptical about this pos-
sibility. I then go on to argue that while many applications 
of MacIntyre’s concept are neutral between forms of work 
that are genuine practices and work that is ‘practice-like’, we 
should prefer a more exacting understanding of practices. 
The account I offer goes beyond MacIntyre’s own discussion 
of practices by drawing a distinction between ‘community-
focused’ practices and ‘excellence-focused’ practices. The 
latter is more ethically promising, and most fulfils the latent 
potential of the concept of practices to provide us with an 
understanding of the best work for humankind. The distinc-
tion between community-focused and excellence-focused 
practices pushes us in the direction of Marx’s conception 
of good work as free, creative activity, and this affinity with 
Marx makes the radical potential of MacIntyre’s concept 
clear: the concept of practices can and should be used to 
critique the bad work that dominates contemporary employ-
ment. I conclude by suggesting that we reflect on the best 
forms of work not in order to denigrate the workers whose 
occupations fall short of these high standards, but so that we 
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can strive to ensure the very best activities, those most con-
sonant with our flourishing, one day become available to all.
Practices and Their Appeal
Practices are the bedrock of MacIntyre’s account of ethics, 
and constitute the initial stage in his definition of a virtue 
(2007, pp. 186–187). In this section, I outline this concept 
and how it has been employed in the business ethics litera-
ture, before going on to offer my own critical development 
of it in the following section. According to MacIntyre, a 
practice is a socially-established, complex and co-operative 
activity “through which goods internal to that form of activ-
ity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those stand-
ards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially 
definitive of, that form of activity” (2007, p. 187). Where 
this realisation of goods is achieved, the effect is both that 
practitioners’ ability to achieve excellence and their con-
ception of the goods of the practice are extended. When I 
excel at painting, that is, when I realise its internal goods, 
I enhance my capacity for excellent artistic creation, and 
my grasp of what excellent painting is, as well as my per-
sonal excellence. This enhancement of the personal excel-
lence of those engaged in a particular practice—the patience 
and artistic sensitivity of a great painter, for instance—is 
intimately related to the achievement of excellence in the 
activity in question—the great paintings the great painter 
produces. As MacIntyre notes, proper engagement in a prac-
tice has “the result that human powers to achieve excellence, 
and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended” (2007, p. 187).
The concept of internal goods, goods which cannot be 
achieved in any way other than by engaging in the activity 
in question, and of the achievement of excellence, means 
that his concept of practices cannot apply to forms of work 
which do not possess such goods—as most do not—nor to 
work that is not morally educative in this way. Furthermore, 
practices are located within a history of practice, and made 
viable by, supporting communities and traditions. In this 
way, the excellent products of a practice shape the stand-
ards that guide our understanding of the relevant excellent 
capacities.
Because those with experience of an activity are bet-
ter qualified to pass judgement on its internal goods, and 
because experiences are liable to differ, it is possible to 
dispute any particular list of examples of practices. Never-
theless, MacIntyre himself names football, chess, architec-
ture, farming, physics, chemistry, biology, history, painting, 
music, sustaining forms of human community, family life 
(2007, pp. 187–188), cricket (2007, p. 191), exploration of 
wilderness (2007, p. 275), and commercial fishing (1994a, 
p. 185; 2016, p. 179) as examples of practices, and gives 
tic-tac-toe, throwing a ball with skill, bricklaying, planting 
turnips (2007, p. 187), and business (2008b, p. 279, see also 
Beadle 2008) as examples of activities that fall short of this 
special status.
Practices require the support of institutions, according 
to MacIntyre. While practices themselves are concerned 
with internal goods, institutions pursue external goods—
power, money, prestige—that are required for the practice 
to survive: football needs clubs and associations, fields of 
scholarly inquiry need universities, etc. When in good order, 
institutions facilitate the practices they house, but they are 
always in danger of coming to dominate the practice instead. 
Where this corrupting domination occurs, the external goods 
can come to be regarded as ends in themselves, and the inter-
nal goods of practices become subordinated to these external 
goods and their pursuit. Hence, balancing the institutional 
needs with those of the goods of the practice is challenging 
and important (see Beadle and Moore 2011).
MacIntyre’s work has had a notable influence in business 
ethics (Ferrero and Sison 2014; Beadle 2017b). While his 
work has proven applicable to many business ethics topics 
beyond the practices-institutions framework, such as corpo-
rate governance (Moore 2012; Bernacchio 2015), regulation 
(Sinnicks 2014), interorganisational networks (Bernacchio 
2018b), corporate philanthropy (Nicholson et al. 2019), 
employee rights (Bernacchio 2020), and so on, it is the 
practices-institutions framework that dominates such appli-
cations. This vein of research draws especially on seminal 
work by Moore (2002, 2005a, b), Moore and Beadle (2006), 
and Beadle and Moore (2006). It has been utilised by cross-
cultural studies (e.g. Fernando and Moore 2015; Chu and 
Moore 2019) and applied to a variety of activities such as 
management (Beabout 2012), public relations (Leeper and 
Leeper 2001), accounting (West 2018), investment advising 
(Wyma 2015), academia in the context of new public man-
agement (Pianezzi et al. 2019), ethical consumption (Garcia-
Ruiz and Rodriguez-Lluesma 2014), and many others.
These contributions within the business and management 
literature largely fall under the heading of what I call ‘right 
MacIntyrean’ research. This distinction is inspired by that 
between ‘right’ Hegelians, who believed that the Prussian 
state was an embodiment of reason, and ‘left’ Hegelians, 
who found in Hegel’s work grounds for a radical critique of 
that state. The matter is more complicated that this distinc-
tion suggests (see Pinkard (2002, pp. 309–316) for a discus-
sion). However, the key point is that so-called right MacIn-
tyreans regard something closely approximating MacIntyre’s 
ethical vision as being compatible with contemporary capi-
talist society, and an engagement with practices largely 
available within the contemporary workplace. In this way, 
they aim to offer an affirmative and reconstructive account 
of good work in capitalist society, and this contrasts with the 
‘left MacIntyrean’ position, which aims to offer a broadly 
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critical account of such work. This ‘right MacIntyrean’ ori-
entation is also present in a growing literature on finance 
that draws on MacIntyre (see Rocchi and Thunder 2019; 
Roncella and Ferrero 2020; Sison et al. 2019; Rocchi et al. 
2020; as well as the somewhat less optimistic Robson 2015), 
and contrasts with a ‘left MacIntyrean’ orientation, which 
I intend to develop in this paper. The ‘left MacIntyrean’ 
position would emphasise MacIntyre’s critique of capitalism 
and his largely sympathetic treatment of Marxism, and sees 
in his concept of a practice grounds for a critique of con-
temporary work, one that motivates a radical opposition to 
capitalist society, rather than grounds for an articulation and 
affirmation of its good features. This is intended as a broad 
distinction. There are, no doubt, innumerable shades of grey 
in the political commitments of scholars who have drawn 
on MacIntyre’s work, and it is also worth noting that ‘right 
MacIntyreans’ are not necessarily on the absolute right of 
the political spectrum: most centre-left political parties in 
the Western world proceed as though human flourishing and 
good work are readily available under capitalism. The term 
‘right MacIntyrean’ thus connotes a position which can be 
defined negatively, as rejecting the radical element of Mac-
Intyre’s politics. ‘Left MacIntyreans’ are those who regard 
practice engagement as being systematically marginalised 
by capitalist society, and ‘right MacIntyreans’ are those who 
would deny that this is so.
MacIntyre’s concept of a practice has been described as 
providing us with a convincing account of the best work 
(Muirhead 2004; Keat 2008), in part because it seems to 
marry subjective enjoyment and objective goodness. Mei 
(2019) notes that many accounts of meaningful work fail to 
properly address the question of what makes work meaning-
ful and why, but Beadle and Knight’s MacIntyrean account 
of meaningful work understands “work as meaningful to 
the extent that both products and practitioners are judged 
by internal standards of excellence” (2012, p. 438). Virtues 
are obviously meaningful, so to locate the meaning of work 
partly in its capacity to morally educate, a concept discussed 
in the context of MacIntyre’s work by Sinnicks (2019), is to 
meet Mei’s worry1. Because of this, MacIntyre’s concept 
of a practice is well-suited to illuminating discussions of 
meaningful work (for instance Beadle 2017c, 2019; Breen 
2007, 2016).
The concept of a practice admits of gradations. Lead-
ing commentators on MacIntyre often refer to work that is 
‘practice-like’, e.g. Beadle and Knight (2012, p. 439), Moore 
(2017, p. 145), and Keat (2008, p. 83). This suggests that 
there is a scale that runs from paradigmatic practices, to less 
paradigmatic practices, to merely ‘practice-like’ activities. 
Applications of MacIntyre’s concept in the business ethics 
literature have typically focused on less paradigmatic prac-
tices as well as ‘practice-like’ forms of work. Indeed, such 
applications often take the form of attempting to persuade 
the reader that some ostensibly pedestrian activity actually 
answers to MacIntyre’s seemingly exclusive description of 
a practice, despite appearances to the contrary. No-one wor-
ries about whether painting, poetry, or philosophy consti-
tutes a practice in MacIntyre’s sense because such activities 
obviously possess the internal goods, social nature, scope 
for excellence, and so on, required for such a status. While 
a study of the goods of painting may be worthwhile, an 
argument designed to show that painting possesses internal 
goods would strike us as being uninformative.
This variation in degree to which a form of work can be 
‘practice-like’ means that, despite the richness and power of 
the concept, some forms of practice-based work may still be 
compatible with bad work. Where work is tedious, fatiguing, 
or alienating, seeking ‘practice-like’ work, is a worthy aspi-
ration. Nevertheless, there remains something unsatisfying 
about the prospect of making ‘practice-like’ work our central 
focus because to do so would be to risk acquiescing too read-
ily to a social arrangement in which genuine practices are 
relatively marginalised.
In his most recent major work, Ethics in the Conflicts of 
Modernity (2016), MacIntyre seems to reiterate his com-
mitment to radical politics. He argues that avarice is “a 
duty” (2016, p. 127) in contemporary capitalist society, that 
Marx’s account of surplus value is key to understanding 
capitalist exploitation (ibid, p. 96), and that trade unions 
willing to engage in “militant strike action” (ibid, p. 107) are 
required for even elementary justice under capitalism. Nev-
ertheless, in this work he also refers to the work of manage-
ment theorist W. Edwards Deming with approval (something 
keenly noted by business ethicists’ reviews of this work—
see Beadle 2017a; Bernacchio 2018a; Sinnicks 2018b) and 
seems more inclined to regard the contemporary workplace 
as a potential site of ethical engagement and fellowship, 
so there is scope to suggest that ‘right MacIntyrean’ appli-
cations are broadly in line with some of MacIntyre’s own 
sympathies. Indeed, while I go on to highlight the affinities 
between MacIntyre’s and Marx’s conceptions of good work 
below, MacIntyre offers some telling criticisms of orthodox 
Marxism in After Virtue (2007) and elsewhere (see Black-
ledge 2014 and Gregson 2019 for commentary on these criti-
cisms). However, my aim is not to attempt to prove which 
position is best supported by MacIntyre’s writings, it is to 
show that my own development of the more radical strand of 
MacIntyre’s work can contribute to the conversation in busi-
ness ethics, especially regarding the ethical quality of work.
Attempts to apply MacIntyre to the study of work and 
organisations draw in particular on his concept of prac-
tices—good, intrinsically rewarding, and morally educative 
1 Though of course there may be other ways to do so, with Mei’s 
own ‘perlocutionary’ perspective being one such example.
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activities—and the institutions which house those practices. 
Despite its widespread use, Couch and Bernacchio note that 
“the practice-institution framework may function to mar-
ginalize class conflict” (2020, p. 640). This is a persuasive 
point, and draws attention to the fact that there are factors 
beyond practices that are relevant to justice in the work-
place. However, Couch and Bernacchio also acknowledge 
that this practice-institution framework “represents the most 
plausible way of applying MacIntyre’s thought to business 
organizations” (2020, p. 634), and in what follows, I aim to 
complement their intervention by focusing on the potentially 
radical nature of practices in order to demonstrate that doing 
so can guide our thoughts about good work in a way compat-
ible with a more radical political orientation.
Recent discussions of automation, such as those provided 
by Ford (2015), Susskind and Susskind (2015), and Danaher 
(2019), allow us to at least imagine a future in which the 
elimination of tedious and fatiguing work is a possibility. 
Even if we are sceptical about its realisability, this prospect 
means we can sensibly ask which activities we would want 
to devote ourselves to if such a possibility came to pass. At 
the very least it seems worth reflecting on what our aspira-
tions for work ought to be. Therefore, in the following sec-
tion, I explore an apparent tension in forms of practice-based 
work in detail, and suggest there is an inconsistency in the 
role community plays in MacIntyre’s concept of a practice 
that allows us to distinguish between community-focused 
practices and excellence-focused practices.
Community‑Focused 
and Excellence‑Focused Practices
‘Right MacIntyrean’ work often seeks to draw attention to 
the ‘core practice’ of organisations in a way that suggests 
all, or almost all, organisations house practices, for exam-
ple Moore (2012, p. 309) and Tsoukas (2018, p. 331). This 
notion is antithetical to the ‘left MacIntyrean’ understand-
ing of contemporary work that I develop here. While on a 
suitably broad interpretation all work is ‘practice-like’, to 
adopt this concept as a central tool in the ethical evaluation 
of work risks diluting the concept of a practice to such a 
degree that, so conceived, it becomes unable to play the role 
MacIntyre ascribes to it, i.e. that of teaching us “how our 
desires and feelings must be disciplined and transformed” 
(2013, p. 27). After all, tic-tac-toe, a non-practice, lacks the 
complexity and sophistication of chess, a practice, but it 
nevertheless does possess some ‘practice-like’ features. It 
may allow for a certain degree of competitive intensity and 
perhaps a limited degree of strategic thought, at least during 
the early stages of engagement before each match becomes 
a predictable draw. It may also allow for a certain sense 
of community with other participants, a central feature of 
MacIntyre’s concept of practices and one to which I return 
below. Thus, the merest requirements for a form of work 
to qualify as ‘practice-like’ are so undemanding as to the 
undermine the worth of the concept.
Of course, ‘right MacIntyreans’ would argue that most 
organisations house forms of work that are meaningfully 
akin to practices, and that there is still a distinction to be 
drawn between ‘practice-like’ work and work that is so hum-
drum that it cannot measure up to this standard. However, 
even if we concede these points, not all goods are equal. 
Indeed, some goods, the goods of tic-tac-toe included, are 
so thin that they are pretty obviously not worth people devot-
ing their lives to, even though some activities are even less 
appealing. Because of this, such activities are thus less worth 
deliberately pursuing or making central to one’s life narra-
tive than are richer activities. The finitude of human experi-
ence means that any list of examples will be controversial, 
but nevertheless, the very intelligibility of an attempt to dis-
tinguish between practices and non-practices, and thus also 
to claim the status of ‘practice-like’ for certain activities, 
is supportive of this basic point, i.e. that we have a shared 
understanding that some goods and some activities are more 
valuable than others.
There remains scope, therefore, for the ‘left MacIntyrean’ 
position to provide reminders about what our aspirations for 
work ought to be. MacIntyre claims that we “ought to eat in 
order to work, not vice versa. The classical expression of this 
view is Aristotle’s, but all artists, most professors and some 
socialists believe it too” (1979b, p. 44). On this view, work 
should, as far as is possible, be something that expresses 
what is best in us, rather than simply providing us with a 
means to survive, or even a meagre engagement in an activ-
ity that just about qualifies as ‘practice-like’. While MacIn-
tyre also notes that “[o]nly sentimentalists believe that work 
ought or can be always interesting” (ibid), by examining his 
concept of a practice in more detail, we find a platform for 
a more ambitious conception of good work than we find in 
most applications of that concept.
While it simply seems worthwhile to reflect on the nature 
of the best forms of work, this task also fits neatly with 
MacIntyre’s original purpose of providing a bedrock for 
his account of ethics. This account of ethics is ultimately 
concerned with what MacIntyre refers to as “man-as-he-
could-be-if-he-realised-his-telos”, which contrasts with “a 
certain view of untutored-human-nature-as-it-is” (2007, p. 
119). According to this perspective, the purpose of ethics 
“is to enable man to pass from his present state to his true 
end” (ibid). The concept of practice plays a key part in Mac-
Intyre’s account of how this progression can be achieved, 
along with an account of the narrative unity of human life 
(2007), traditions of enquiry (1988), and an account of our 
metaphysical biology (1999b). These considerations provide 
a rationale for a more demanding and aspirational use of the 
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concept of practices, as activities that play a central role in 
our quest to avoid the moral barrenness of the present order, 
and to realise our nature as, inter alia, rational and creative 
beings capable of excellence.
However, it is not that ‘right MacIntyreans’ have simply 
been too generous in their application of the concept of a 
practice. Instead I suggest that MacIntyre’s own formulation 
of the concept runs together two distinct forms of practice. 
These forms are ‘community-focused practices’, in which 
the communal elements far outweigh the importance of 
the particular activity which is the ostensible focus of the 
community, and ‘excellence-focused practices’, in which 
the contours and nuances of the activity itself are of central 
importance. On this reading, community-focused practices 
align with the Aristotelian sense of politics as making and 
sustaining human forms of community. As a result of this 
distinction, I argue that MacIntyre’s own account is insuffi-
ciently aspirational about the best work for humankind. Once 
this distinction is drawn, and its consequences outlined, it 
reveals a richer conception of the best kinds of work.
Let us return to MacIntyre’s own examples of practices: 
football, chess, architecture, farming, physics, chemistry, 
biology, history, painting, music, sustaining forms of human 
community, family life, cricket, exploration of wilderness, 
and commercial fishing. While these examples make it clear 
that the scope of practices is wide, there is some clustering 
within the examples, e.g. sports and games, fields of schol-
arly inquiry, arts, and practical or productive activities. Each 
of these clusters has their own distinctive features, but it is 
this last cluster, productive activities, that stands out as being 
especially distinct, a point noted by Miller (1994) and Hager 
(2011), amongst others.
When we reflect on the goods of various sports, fields of 
scholarly inquiry, and arts, we may be aware of the degree 
to which such activities are supported by their relevant com-
munities of practice—athletes need coaches, teammates, and 
competitors; scholars need teachers, students, and interlocu-
tors; artists need inspirations and audiences.2 Nevertheless, 
the various activities involved seem to stand apart from those 
communities in certain ways.3 Even if the supporting com-
munity is necessary to sustain the activity, engaging in the 
activity itself seems sufficient for it to be worthwhile. By 
contrast, productive activities such as fishing seem to attain 
this status only in virtue of the communal relationships they 
involve, and not due to the nature of the activity itself. When 
discussing the example of fishing, MacIntyre emphasises 
“the goods of the common life of such a crew” (1994a, p. 
185), and indeed the fishing village as a whole. The goods of 
commercial fishing interconnect with “three related common 
goods, those of family, crew, and local community” (2016, 
p. 179). Whereas they seem to be required in the case of 
fishing, when we reflect on the imagination and sensitivity 
of the painter, for instance, this sort of appeal seems to be 
unnecessary for us to understand what is good and choice-
worthy about the activity of painting.
Where an appeal to the life of the local community is 
required to explain what is valuable about a form of work, 
this is a sign that it is intrinsically undesirable, or at the very 
least that it lacks the special appeal of arts, games, and fields 
of scholarly inquiry. Such community seems to be available 
even where the activity in question is tiresome and uninspir-
ing. Indeed, this appeal to the wider community seems to 
undermine MacIntyre’s exclusion of non-practices entirely. 
Consider the examples of turnip-planting and fishing. The 
former is a definitive example of a non-practice (see Mac-
Intyre 2007, p. 187) and the latter is a definitive example of 
a practice, according to MacIntyre (1994a, p. 185; 2016, 
p. 179). However, a colony of turnip-planters could enjoy 
the sense of community available to those engaged in fish-
ing, including both the fishing crew and the fishing village. 
Turnip-planting, under the right circumstances, could eas-
ily interconnect with the goods of family, immediate work-
mates, and local community.
Perhaps members of the colony of turnip-planters need 
not rely on the virtues of others to the degree that members 
of the fishing crew do. The inherent dangers of working at 
sea mean that fishing crews depend on the bravery of other 
members, for instance. However, we can tweak the example 
so that it refers specifically to turnip-planters in a region 
prone to earthquake or famine, or where the turnip-planters 
are in danger of predation by wild animals. Increasing the 
risks involved in turnip-planting in this way may well make 
individual planters more reliant on the courage, steadfast-
ness, and solidarity of their co-workers, but it would not 
elevate the activity of turnip-planting.
To put it another way, if removing health and safety 
regulations can make a form of work more ‘practice-like’, 
because it requires a greater degree of courage or of reliance 
on the courage of others, then practice begins to seem less 
useful a concept with which to explore the nature of good 
work.
Of course, even turnip-planters who live in a less dan-
gerous region may still require their co-workers and neigh-
bours to possess the virtues, in order to facilitate their shared 
endeavour and shared life together. However, in this case 
the turnip-planters would be engaged in the Aristotelian 
practice of politics, which seems to capture most of what 
is valuable—good, intrinsically rewarding, and morally 
2 These domains are not so neatly separated in real life, of course. 
Artists have teachers and students, scholars have competitors, and so 
on.
3 Perhaps most notably in the case of the arts. ‘Outsider art’, as well 
as the possibility of the self-taught artist, suggest that great art could 
be possible even if isolation from a wider community, though dia-
logue with historical precedent is often important.
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educative—about the life of the fishing crew and the fish-
ing village. So, it seems there is nothing about the activity 
of fishing that distinguishes it from a clear and definitive 
example of a non-practice such as turnip-planting. If there 
is anything we want from an account of good work, then it 
is an ability to distinguish work that is ennobling and intrin-
sically rewarding from work that is not. Therefore, my dis-
tinction between excellence-focused and community-focused 
practices seems to be required if the broader concept is to be 
able to do this. All artists, most professors, and some social-
ists may eat in order to work, as MacIntyre claims, but one 
imagines that relatively few members of fishing crews do. 
In this regard fishing crews and turnip-planters are alike.
What these observations show is that excellence-focused 
practices, as I have called them, are qualitatively different 
from community-focused practices, and a superior and pref-
erable form of practice, other things being equal. Thus, in 
our reflections on the forms of work we hold to be most 
worthy of our aspirations, we should prioritise excellence-
focused practices, even if the realities of having to make a 
living in capitalist society make such aspirations difficult to 
realise. MacIntyre’s concept, which at first sight may appear 
to be excessively exclusive, ruling out perhaps a variety of 
activities ‘right MacIntyreans’ have sought to defend, is in 
fact insufficiently so. While both excellence-focused and 
community-focused practices, as I have characterised them, 
are practices in MacIntyre’s sense, the former are more con-
sonant with our aspirations regarding what work might be at 
its best, i.e. something we would eat in order to partake in.
This argument does not entail that anyone whose life is 
shaped by an engagement in a community-focused practice 
should be agitating for a career change—their life narrative 
may mean that the community-focused practice in question 
really is the best life for the person in question. My aim is 
to offer an analytical framework that might help to guide 
our reflections on the best forms of work, not to denigrate 
any number of well-lived lives. Furthermore, it is important 
to note that my distinction is based on the focus of the two 
kinds of activity, and does not imply that excellence and 
community are mutually exclusive. Indeed, both kinds of 
practice are sites of community and of excellence, and must 
be if they are to genuinely constitute practices. Community-
focused practices can give rise to excellence, and excellence-
focused practices require, and in their development give rise 
to, communities. But even here, there is a telling difference. 
Community-focused practices require participants to develop 
and display a variety of excellences if they are to survive, 
as to sustain a community is to participate in the practice 
of politics in the Aristotelian sense, and thus will always 
require excellent qualities such as good-judgement, cour-
age, solidarity, justice, and so on. Without such excellence, 
community-focused practices will always be vulnerable and 
liable to be undermined by various threats, including both 
institutional acquisitiveness and institutional inefficiency.
Similarly, excellence-focused practices still require the 
supporting network of practitioners, and the example of 
historical precedents in order to allow for the systematic 
extension of goods and conceptions of goods required for 
practice status. This is essential for our flourishing, and 
indeed there can be no refinement of our virtuous capaci-
ties in excellence-focused practices without a supporting 
network of community membership that provides an initial 
and continuing moral education. Hence the need for vir-
tues of acknowledged dependence (MacIntyre 1999b; Han-
nis 2015), which are pre-requisites of our development as 
independent rational agents, i.e. the sorts of agents capa-
ble of engaging in excellence-focused practices. However, 
excellence-focused practices also give rise to communi-
ties of practice in virtue of the allure of the activity, and 
their eventual social establishment arises from this appeal. 
Excellence-focused practices are thus more appealing due to 
the depth of connection between the goods of the practice 
and the good per se, and they are also more enduring in an 
important sense. The appeal of the activities at the heart 
of excellence-focused practices ensures they can survive a 
variety of challenges more easily than particular community-
focused practices. Paradigmatic examples of excellence-
focused practices such as physics and philosophy endure, 
even when a putative community-focused practice such as 
coal mining declines. Physics and philosophy would likely 
survive as human activities in an era of automation, but coal 
mining would not. However, even though I aim to highlight 
the differences between these concepts, this important over-
lap ensures that both remain intrinsically valuable and per-
fective of participants.
MacIntyre’s running of excellence-focused and com-
munity-focused practices together may be the result of a 
laudable recognition on his part of the dignity of workers, 
and a resulting desire to grant their work a central place in 
an account of the good life. However, to draw the distinc-
tion between excellence-focused and community-focused 
practices, and to recognise the former as being preferable 
is the result of a desire to imagine a world in which the 
very best kinds of activity are available to all. To recog-
nise that excellence-focused practitioners necessarily have 
the opportunity to participate in a community, indeed they 
could hardly do otherwise, as well as the activity in question 
(i.e. painting, music) ensures that excellence-focused prac-
tices are necessarily multifaceted. Those engaged in such 
practices are typically engaged both in the excellent activity 
in question as well as the Aristotelian practice of politics. 
Community-focused practitioners, by contrast, have Aris-
totelian politics as their primary practice, and the activity 
the community focuses on—fishing, turnip-planting, coal 
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mining, or whatever—is only a practice in the sense that it is 
a particular instantiation or focus of that practice of politics.
This argument extends beyond MacIntyrean understand-
ings of community. Community can be understood in two 
ways. MacIntyre’s Aristotelian account is relatively focused 
and rich and applies to communities in which members share 
values in some meaningful way, in which there is a degree 
of personal familiarity, or engagement in a particular shared 
project. There is also the broader and thinner sense in which 
the liberal democratic polity is a community, a sense com-
patible with the work of liberal thinkers such as Dworkin 
(1986) and others. Bellah et al.’s (2007) account of work as 
a calling brings social contribution into contact with, pre-
dominantly, this latter sense of community. On this account, 
good work “links a person to the larger community, a whole 
in which the calling of each is a contribution to the good of 
all… The calling is a crucial link between the individual and 
the public world. Work in the sense of calling can never be 
merely private” (Bellah et al. 2007, p. 66). The distinction 
I have drawn between community-focused and excellence-
focused practices is also well-placed to account for where 
this model falls short.
Indeed, while there is a rich ethical core to the concept 
of social contribution, it is still compatible with arduous, 
unpleasant, undesirable, and perhaps even plainly bad work. 
Someone might contribute to their community by, and derive 
a great deal of satisfaction from, participating in a litter-pick 
in the local park. However, this contribution to the common 
good, which links the individual to the public world, hardly 
suggests that litter-picking is an activity we would want to 
hold up as a form of work to which we should aspire. Of 
course, our intuitions about what elevates an activity are 
bound up with our understanding of what is possible. A 
community litter-pick of the local park strikes us as being 
noble because it is good to beautify a public space, to protect 
wildlife, and so on, and because there is no readily available 
easier method of achieving these ends. A community drive 
to carry blocks of stone by hand from a quarry many miles 
away in order to build a new cathedral would strike us as 
being perverse precisely because there are easier methods 
of transportation available. What once may have been an 
admirable act of devotion, i.e. when those methods of trans-
portation were unavailable, would now be an absurd act of 
self-harm. When reflecting on the best forms of work, the 
litter-pick has the same status as carrying blocks of stone 
by hand. Contributing to the community remains a valuable 
good, but we can be more selective about the form that con-
tribution can take when trying to account for the best work.
This point also applies to any number of intrinsically 
undesirable but nevertheless worthy and dignified jobs. 
Hamilton et al. (2019) outline how focusing on the social 
contribution of their work allows refuse collectors to reframe 
their stigmatised work as being of value. In such cases this 
reframing serves to bind the workers to the broader com-
munity which they are, at the same time, partially alien-
ated from in virtue of the stigmatisation that arises from 
physically dirty work. We would do well to remember how 
important a social contribution is made by any number of 
dirty, dangerous, and unpleasant occupations, but dirty, dan-
gerous, and unpleasant they remain. Furthermore, we can 
readily imagine morally corrupting jobs making a social 
contribution—a torturer might help to secure conviction of 
a heinous criminal, an assassin might eliminate the leader of 
a rogue state and thereby contribute to political stability, for 
instance—without wishing to hold these up as choiceworthy 
occupations. It may be that only sentimentalists think work 
can be always interesting—or good, intrinsically rewarding, 
and morally educative—but it is reasonable to wish it were 
so4, and to refuse to let this unhappy realisation shape our 
conception of which forms of work we should aspire to. 
Having argued that there is an important distinction between 
community-focused and excellence-focused practices, in 
the following section I elaborate on the ‘left MacIntyrean’ 
approach by tracing its links with Marx’s reflections on good 
work.
Marx and Macintyre on Good Work
Much of MacIntyre’s early work constitutes an engagement 
with Marxism (see Blackledge and Davidson 2008), but he 
came to regard Marxism as seriously inadequate, in part 
because Marx turned away from philosophy prematurely 
(MacIntyre 1994b; Knight 2000), and some commentators 
have stressed the dissimilarities between MacIntyre and 
Marx (Burns 2011; Callinicos 2011). Nevertheless, affinities 
remain, even if, as Groff (2012) argues, MacIntyre does not 
avail himself of Marx’s insights as often as he might. In this 
section, I draw out some shared concerns which unite Mac-
Intyre’s and Marx’s conceptions of good work, with the aim 
of elaborating on the shape a ‘left MacIntyrean’ approach to 
business ethics might take5.
Marx’s work has, perhaps unsurprisingly, generated 
relatively few contributions to the business ethics literature 
(see Corlett 1998; Kerlin 1998; Shaw 2009 for examples). 
It thus stands in contrast to MacIntyre, whose work has, as 
I noted above, been very widely cited and highly influential 
4 The anti-work tradition would suggest that it is reasonable to wish 
we did not have to work at all. See Gorz (1985), Frayne (2015), and 
Fleming (2015) for examples of work in this tradition.
5 De George (1989) makes a distinction between ‘ethics in busi-
ness’—i.e. ethics within the exchange transaction-focused domain of 
business—from ‘business ethics’—i.e. the broader field of intellectual 
enquiry that includes questions about the ethical quality of work, the 
justness of markets, etc. Here I appeal to the latter concept.
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in business ethics, perhaps surprisingly given his hostility 
to corporate modernity. However, the most ethically aspi-
rational elements of MacIntyre’s reflections on work have 
important similarities with Marx’s thought. As a result, there 
is scope for a ‘left MacIntyrean’ approach to business ethics 
which would see the concept of excellence-focused practices 
as a tool which can be used to critique much contemporary 
work, guide our conception of the best work for humankind, 
and motivate a closer engagement with Marx’s work by busi-
ness ethicists who draw on MacIntyre’s work.
Indeed, the analysis of practices I have offered can be used 
both positively and negatively. The negative use emphasises 
the fact that the concept of a practice can ground a critique 
of contemporary work akin to Marx’s account of alienated 
labour. From this perspective, practices are relatively mar-
ginalised in our society, and most people have a “treadmill 
of a job” (MacIntyre 2015, p. 18) which merely enables 
them to satisfy “the need to maintain [their] physical exist-
ence” (Marx 1994, p. 75). The positive use emphasises the 
similarities between MacIntyre’s concept of a practice and 
Marx’s conception of good work as free, creative activity.
To emphasise the importance of excellence-focused prac-
tices may seem excessively optimistic, utopian even. Marx 
opposed utopianism, and mocked those who would write 
recipes for “the cook-shops of the future” (1976, p. 99), and 
yet was willing to offer some comments on the likely nature 
of unalienated labour. Likewise, MacIntyre chides what he 
calls “utopianisms of the future” for being “misleading and 
corrupting” (2008a, p. 7), although he regards “utopianism 
of the present” (ibid) as a valuable part of political and phil-
osophical thought. Utopianisms of the present, according to 
MacIntyre, refuse to sacrifice the present in pursuit of some 
dreamt up future utopia, but recognise the range of possi-
bilities open to us (2008a, p. 5), even if they do “involve 
a rejection of the economic goals of advanced capitalism” 
(MacIntyre 1999b, p. 145). It is this kind of utopianism that 
motivates the ‘left MacIntyrean’ emphasis on the very best 
forms of practice. Such a perspective refuses to take contem-
porary work as an ethically substantive baseline, as doing 
so would then lead us to be impressed by even minor and 
trivial improvements. It holds, rather, that we should aim to 
make work—so central a feature of all of our lives—as good 
as it could be.
A more substantive similarity between Marx and Mac-
Intyre is their shared Aristotelianism. For Aristotle, human 
action ultimately aims at a vision of flourishing, which is the 
bar against which all aspects of social life are to be assessed. 
MacIntyre (2007) explicitly attempts to develop an account 
of virtues that continues the Aristotelian tradition, and, in 
contrast to Aristotle’s own political conservatism, refers 
to his position as revolutionary Aristotelianism (2008a)6. 
Marx’s commitment to Aristotelianism is perhaps somewhat 
less visible, but has been documented expertly by Meikle 
(1985) and Pike (1999), and underpins his conception of 
ethics. Blackledge (2012) also explores some of the ethical 
commitments that unite Aristotle, Marx, and MacIntyre. Of 
these shared commitments, the most important to my present 
concerns is their reflections on work. The central distinction 
in Aristotle’s discussion of work is that between praxis, i.e. 
intrinsically motivated activity, and poesis, which refers to 
productive activity and captures a sense of instrumentally 
motivated activity more generally (see Nicomachean Ethics 
1140b1-5). Aristotle himself employed this distinction in a 
fashion that now strikes us as being unduly dismissive of the 
worth of the ordinary worker, whose labour he regarded as 
inimical to virtue (Politics 1328b39–1329a2), but as a way 
of characterising the sort of activities we would wish for 
everyone to enjoy were tedious labour unnecessary, then it 
captures something important. While this distinction is not 
identical to that between ‘excellence-focused’ and ‘commu-
nity-focused’ practices, the affinity is clear.
The ethically developmental aspect of practices, as of 
praxis, has an affinity with Marx’s vision of work that facili-
tates the “all round development of the individual” (1978a, 
p. 531). Marx and Engels claim that this all-round devel-
opment of individuals requires work that constitutes “free 
manifestations of their lives” (1970, p. 117), and thus the 
sort of work that we would wish to retain if freed from bur-
densome toil. Taken literally, ‘all round’ development—the 
development of all of one’s abilities—may be an unrealistic 
aim, and perhaps even an undesirable one given its connota-
tions of dilettantism. Indeed, it may well be impossible given 
that some abilities limit others: I cannot become a champion 
bodybuilder and a champion marathon runner. Nevertheless, 
the freedom to develop our powers is important, but like 
MacIntyre, Marx is not neutral between which powers are 
most worth cultivating.
Marx claims that we are free only when engaged in free 
labour (1973, p. 661)—or as he sometimes puts it “really 
free” labour (ibid.)—but sees work as central to our nature as 
creative and productive beings (see Marx 1994, pp. 71–78). 
This foundational position means work occupies a role in 
Marx’s thought that parallels the role of practices in Mac-
Intyre’s. Marx’s vision of unalienated labour prioritises the 
model of the artist, and indeed Marx conceives of good work 
“on a continuum with free artistic creation” (Sayers 2011, 
p. 23). Where work most fully contributes to this develop-
ment, it ceases to be something spurned, and indeed can be 
seen as “life’s prime want” (Marx 1978a, p. 531). From this 
6 Note that a revolutionary perspective is hardly necessary if the opti-
mism characteristic of the ‘right MacIntyrean’ position is correct.
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perspective, “in truly human work, the individual experi-
ences self affirmation, a true sense of concrete individuality, 
a sense of creative self expression, and a sense of personal 
empowerment” (Granter 2009, p. 55). All artists, most pro-
fessors, and some socialists may feel this way in contempo-
rary society, but in a better world this orientation to work 
would be more widespread precisely because the best forms 
of work would themselves also be more widely available. 
Marx’s claim here clearly foreshadows MacIntyre’s notion 
that, ideally, we would eat in order to work, and indeed finds 
support in the analysis of excellence-focused practices I 
offered above.
Marx also notes that, unlike other animals, humankind 
produces, i.e. works, even “when free of physical need and 
in fact truly produces only when free of such need… The 
animal fashions things only in accord with the standard and 
need of its species, whereas… man fashions things also in 
accord with the law of beauty” (1994, p. 76), even if work 
under current conditions sometimes blinds us to this law, as 
Marx says of the mineral dealer who can no longer appreci-
ate the beauty of the minerals (1978b, p. 89). This thought 
corresponds to MacIntyre’s claim that, while practices 
require institutional support in order to survive, these insti-
tutions can corrupt practices by leading to an undue focus 
on the pursuit of external goods like money, power, and sta-
tus. One imagines that merely ‘practice-like’ activities are 
especially prone to such corruption, given that their internal 
goods are less impressive, and thus less likely to remain 
compelling in the face of the commercial and institutional 
pressures that dominate the contemporary workplace.
In Capital: Volume 3, Marx argues that “the realm of 
freedom actually begins only where labour which is deter-
mined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; 
thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of 
actual material production” (1981, p. 807). This passage is 
often taken to imply that Marx moved away from his youth-
ful optimism about the nature work might take in a future 
society, and again like MacIntyre, felt that tiring and tedi-
ous work was an ineliminable feature of human social life. 
But whether or not genuinely good, i.e. free, creative, and 
excellence-focused, work can be available to all, it is entirely 
possible to believe that free and creative activity is the ideal 
form of work. As Veltman notes, “the limitedness of mean-
ingful work is not a reason to reject the normative claim that 
meaningful work is integral in well-being, nor is it a reason 
against working to transform social and political institutions 
so as to increase opportunities for meaningful work” (2015, 
p. 728). We can make a similar claim for excellence-focused 
practices, which raise the bar beyond both merely meaning-
ful and practice-like forms of work.
Excellence-focused practices as an ideal make visible 
the ethically impoverished state of work in capitalist soci-
ety. However, this ideal is not bound up with a misguided 
utopianism, it is already present in our social arrangements. 
After all, excellence-focused activities play a part, even if 
only a small part, in most of our lives. The arts, games, 
sciences, and the asking of philosophical questions—the 
broad categories under which most excellence-focused 
practices fall—are seen as an essential part of the educa-
tion of children and young adults, and yet interest in many 
of these practices is often regarded as, at best, a curious 
eccentricity in adult life (as noted by MacIntyre 2006). The 
underlying principle seems to be that it is important for us 
to engage in these activities up until such time as we enter 
the workplace. It would be odd, however, if the good of the 
adult were so radically distinct from that of the child or the 
young adult that so abrupt a shift in focus were amenable 
to human flourishing, though the quest to make all educa-
tion as relevant as possible to the contemporary workplace 
means that the number of opportunities we each have to 
engage in excellence-focused practices recedes further. The 
‘left MacIntyrean’ perspective I have sought to develop in 
this paper would thus encourage us to take the judgements 
about what constitutes a worthwhile activity in our formative 
years into the workplace, in which we, of course, continue 
to be formed long after our formal education is complete. 
Being able to transcend the narrowly proscribed role moral-
ity of the contemporary workplace is essential to human 
flourishing. As MacIntyre says “a plain person who begins 
to understand her or his life as an uneven progress towards 
the achievement of her or his good is thus to some signifi-
cant extent transformed into a moral philosopher” (1992, p. 
4), a transformation which may be aided by the systematic 
extension of our conceptions of the ends and goods of the 
very best activities.
Conclusion
By distinguishing between excellence-focused and commu-
nity-focused practices we can keep the very best forms of 
work in view. To understand practices in this way allows us 
to see how a ‘left MacIntyrean’ perspective can contribute 
to conversations about good work, and can ground a critique 
of work as it currently exists in capitalist modernity, as well 
as why Marx’s reflections on work are worth engaging with, 
even though necessity and mundane considerations are still 
very much to the fore. Good work, much less the best work, 
is not available to all. Drudgery might be all but inelimina-
ble from social life, but such an admission does not entail 
that our reflections and aspirations, both as individuals and 
as a society, should not be steered by this modestly utopian 
vision. Aristotle’s dismissal of ordinary workers, includ-
ing those engaged in community-focused practices such as 
farming, is an unwarranted and unpalatable aspect of his 
ethical thought, and yet a recognition that some forms of 
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work—excellence-focused practices—are superior gives us a 
reason to aim to ensure that such work is one day widespread 
and, if possible, available to all. This allows us to avoid Aris-
totle’s own unattractive and unjustified elitism about human 
flourishing, which he held was restricted to well-born and 
wealthy gentlemen, even if the thought that freedom from 
tedious labour is required for flourishing animates the pre-
sent discussion. Aristotle himself was unable to entertain 
the notion that we might want to ensure that everyone is free 
from irksome toil, and instead able to participate in what I 
have termed excellence-focused practices. We can be against 
Aristotle’s elitism, while at the same time hoping for a future 
in which everyone has the opportunity to participate in the 
very best activities. In other words, we want an elitism about 
practice, not about people.
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